sipa changed the topic of #bitcoin-wizards to: This channel is for discussing theoretical ideas with regard to cryptocurrencies, not about short-term Bitcoin development | http://bitcoin.ninja/ | This channel is logged. | For logs and more information, visit http://bitcoin.ninja
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<dgenr8>
SPV what proofs? SPV candy-corn proofs? SPV is a technique, not a statement.
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<Taek>
e0, andytoshi, other: if we were to substantially reduce the maximum transaction size, at what point does it become problematic for TumbleBit/MimbleWimble/other?
<Taek>
waxwing: what about for joinmarket?
<Taek>
fluffypony: what about for Monero? I know it's a different blockchain but still useful to know.
<kanzure>
you want smaller than schnorr signatures?
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<Taek>
no but for Jute it makes some things a lot easier if I can cap the block size at 10kb or even 5kb. I'm not certain how many things get ruined by that limit though
<Taek>
there's a tradoff between confirmation time, throughput speed limit, and block size.
<Taek>
High throughput speed limit = high block size + low confirmation time
<Taek>
low throughput speed limit = low block size + low confirmation time || high block size + high confirmation time
<katu>
Taek: can speak only for joinmarket, not much would change there. the participant pool size is limited roughly to hundreds, after that the likelyhood of one bailing is getting too high.
<kanzure>
Taek: if you strip away most of the features, such as reducing the number of transaction types to one, you could probably get away with a single signature per block and some low-bit account representation or something..
<Taek>
kanzure: hopefully won't need to go that far, but I guess for a lot of things schnorr combining gets you a lot of wiggle room.
<Taek>
I'm not sure that would apply to MW though, since that uses a different type of cryptography
<katu>
why force the block size btw, to enforce tree fanout?
<katu>
s/tree/dag/
<Taek>
Security in Jute benefits *substantially* from a very small block time. 1 second is okay, but things don't get really friendly until like 0.5 seconds
<Taek>
(will be sharing full writeup tonight - just 1 more paragraph to touch up)
<Taek>
At a 1 second block time, 10kb blocks means 6MB every 10 minutes
<Taek>
Which, I think is pretty reasonable given that Jute gives you a lot of scalability benefits
<Taek>
But it's 12MB if you drop to a 0.5 second block time, or 24MB if you decide that you want both a 0.5 second block time and 20kb blocks
<Taek>
and that's probably too much
<katu>
still cant really figure out why hard caps would be of consequences wrt block time (other than verify latencies), but will wait for the writeup.
<Taek>
you don't want an attacker to be able to start throwing 1MB blocks at the network every 5 seconds, most full nodes would not be able to keep up. That I think is the only reason.
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<katu>
these blocks have equal chance of confirming like anything else, dont they?
<Taek>
as long as all nodes could keep up with the throughput, their probability of confirming would be 100%
<katu>
in that case, dos is prevented by perbyte fees.
<Taek>
that's potentially an option
<Taek>
I also don't think it would be too difficult to have a difficulty-based-on-blocksize modification, which would be really beneficial for enthusiests who might want to mine all of their own transactions
<Taek>
I think it would be reasonable that a 500 byte txn could be mined by a $200 miner within an hour
<Taek>
solo-mining, no pool necessary!
<katu>
just take long term mean average and allow +5% on top of that
<katu>
not sure who wrote that proposal, but i like the natural simplicity of it
<sipa>
long term mean is pretty dangerous
<sipa>
it allows miners to stuff their own blocks to pumo up the size
<katu>
sipa: costs fees
<katu>
sipa: also, only for the duration of the pool actually doing it. once they stop, the average returns to normal.
<Taek>
what decides how high the fees are?
<katu>
this operates on the assumption that mempool has always something on offer. fee cost = they have to sacrifice legit mempool txes in favor of their phony ones.
<Taek>
ah
<Taek>
it's just a one-time cost though right? Once you've pushed the average up you've now got room for the mempool txns and for your own fluff?
<Taek>
I guess it depends on your hashrate
<katu>
Taek: the average is there to establish the cutoff - which is necessary for fee market.
<katu>
balooning the capacity artificially indeed bottoms the price level of fee market, but costs you fee opportunity.
<sipa>
i disagree with the idea that miners should have any influence at all on maximum throughput
<sipa>
they are exactly the ones that benefit from it
<katu>
indeed
<katu>
if they form cartel, they can extort fees
<sipa>
the limits should be set by what the technology can deal with, and nothing else
<katu>
but then again, if they form cartel, dont we have bigger problems at hand?
<sipa>
larger blocks give extra opportunity for larger cartels
<sipa>
so they not only provide a means for higher income at the cost of every othet validation node, they also give an extra incentive to cartelize, as larger blocks can be used to compete smaller players out of the market
<katu>
sipa: i agree with current pool situation, dynamically adjusted fees and market is just not feasible
<katu>
but there will be increasing pressure for this as mining reward drops
<sipa>
maybe, the dynamics of that aren't entirely clear to me
<sipa>
but to me, capacity limits are there as means for fully validating nodes (seen as the ones who decide the consensus rules) to limit the advantage larger miners can have over smaller ones, as it is in their best interest to not incentivize centralization of mining
<sipa>
(that's not the only reason of course, another is to prevent resource requirememts to grow beyond what these full nodes themselves can deal with)
<katu>
nod. though jute/braid style proposals this seems to be alleviated a bit (the david vs golliath problem, but not necessarily the race to the bottom and everyone taking bigger bite than they can swallow in market race)
<katu>
though *in
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<kanzure>
"denial-of-service is prevented by per byte fees" well if you mean as a replacement for block size, i think that would mean a moving transaction fee floor minimum enforced by consensus rules?
<kanzure>
no, nevermind. i haven't factored in anything from the dynamic validation cost target work.
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<Taek>
drat
<Taek>
I realized that my algorithm for getting a total ordering on a graph doesn't yield the required safety properties
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<Taek>
:< disappointing
<Taek>
Bitcoin provides a safety property such that for any block with N confirmations, that block cannot be invalidated without the introduction of at least N additional blocks
<Taek>
For DAGs to have similar security, you need the same property. For any block with N confirmations/decendents, you cannot give that block new ancestors without adding at least N new blocks
<Taek>
I thought my algorithm had that property, but it turns out it does not
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<nicolagreco>
I have quite of a naive question: are utxo transactions and an op return transactions mutually exclusive? meaning that I cannot use op_return in a transaction (say A sends money to B and writes something in the op_code, this is not possible, right?)
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> nicolagreco: in theory you could push data to the stack and then drop it again, which is equivalent to a NOP in the script
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> You could also have a transaction with an OP_RETURN output and a second output that sends actual money to someone
<nicolagreco>
Jeremy_Rand: great, in other words, my question really is: is there a way to write extra data to a transaction (without burning money)
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> nicolagreco: it will almost definitely cost extra money to insert data to a transaction, since it will make the tx larger. Also many miners may not like people using the blockchain to store data.
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> (Well, same goes for many non-miners.)
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<nicolagreco>
Jeremy_Rand: the reason I am asking this question is because in a blockstack talk I heard that they had to burn 10k to do one particular operation (buying a tld) and I was like: "if we burn money this way, to store an op_return, we will slowly decrease the amount of bitcoin available"
<nicolagreco>
so I wonder if there are "healthier" operations, so having things costing extra money, as long as that money is recirculated is fine (if that money disappears -> gets burned, well, not really)
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<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> nicolagreco: my understanding is that Blockstack's system is destroying coins as a method of introducing name scarcity, not specifically because it's needed in order to store the data.
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<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> You could instead pay the coins as a fee to miners, but that changes incentives
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> Which could in some cases lead to incentives for miner misbehavior
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> (The Namecoin devs have had this discussion quite a lot)
<katu>
the main problem i see is that you mix speculative currency with commodity
<katu>
ideally a commodity value should be that of commodity (real demand of names), not of speculative whims
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> katu: agreed. If pegged sidechains had been a thing when Namecoin was created in 2011, I'm pretty sure NMC wouldn't be a currency. NMC having speculators has been a source of annoyance for everyone involved.
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> That wouldn't solve every problem Namecoin has, but it would at least be an improvement I think
<katu>
well, the idea is to achieve peg to dollar somehow. provided thast demand for names is constant over time (short of somebody trying to corner commodity market), if bitcoin value against dollar doubles, the price of name in bitcoin should halve. not sure if blockstack does this.
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> katu: I don't believe Blockstack does that. Bitshares's now-defunct naming chain tried to solve that, and the only solution they came up with was to have a static membership multiparty signature that dictated what the exchange rate was
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> Which isn't necessarily a horrible idea in principle, it's basically how Tor's dirauths work, but it was sufficiently centralized that Namecoin rejected that approach
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<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> That said, Bitshares's naming chain had so many other severe problems that centralized price feeds was the least of the concerns
<katu>
my reasoning is that real commodity demand is the anchor to the valuation in usd. ie most customers are like "id should cost about 20usd a year". if it costs more, less ids is bought. a simple mechanism would be simply ratelimiting amount of ids registered, and then making going over that limit proportionally more expensive. of course the problem is getting constant demand in the first place.
<katu>
for example in DNS, demand for established tlds can be considered constant, but novel systems suffer from adoption curve
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> katu: right, exactly. If we could expect the number of registrations in Namecoin's DNS namespace to be a similar function so, say, ICANN's .biz, it would be a lot simpler
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> But since Namecoin's usability is expected to increase over time, it's really hard to predict what the curve will do
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> s/so/to
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<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> katu: something that's been floated as a potential name pricing system is PoS voting based on something like the median of votes
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> in theory it's probably safe under the assumption that the people who have lots of NMC also want the name system to be successful
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> whether that's a true assumption is questionable. Last I heard about 1/3 of all the NMC in existence are in the BTC-e cold wallet.
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> Also I kind of dislike that approach on the principle that it requires NMC to be a currency.
<qpm>
tx:<Jeremy_Rand> Not like I have any obviously better ideas
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